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United States Citrus Science Council v. United States Department of 
Agriculture, 2017 WL 4844376 (E.D. Cal. 2017) 
 
Stephanie A. George 
 
As our world becomes increasingly more dependent on global 
trade, issues have arisen with respect to the harm caused to domestic 
producers. In U.S. Citrus Science Council v. USDA, the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of California clarified domestic 
lemon producers’ standing to challenge agency decisions that result in the 
importation of foreign crops. This decision could create similar pathways 
for future challenges to the importation of other commodities into the 
United States.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 In May 2016, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
(“APHIS”) promulgated a rule to lift a ban on the importation of lemons 
from Argentina for the first time since 1947.1 The rule was challenged by 
individual citrus growers, citrus packinghouses, and the U.S. Citrus 
Council (“Council”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”).2 APHIS and the United 
States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) (collectively, “Defendants”) 
contested the Plaintiffs’ standing to challenge the regulation.3 The district 
court found that the Plaintiffs established standing through competition 
and the risk of environmental harm to domestic producers from pests.4 
  
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 California and Arizona are the primary lemon growing regions in 
the United States.5 Since 1947, regulations have barred the importation of 
lemons and other citrus fruits from Argentina.6 The Plant Protection Act 
(“PPA”) and its predecessor statutes authorized these regulations, which 
allows the Secretary of the USDA “to issue regulations ‘to prevent the 
introduction of plant pests into the United States or the dissemination of 
plant pests within the United States.’”7 This authority has been delegated 
to APHIS, which has issued a number of regulations on fruits and 
vegetables being imported into the United States.8  
                                                     
1. United States Citrus Science Council v. United States Department 
of Agriculture, 2017 WL 4844376, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2017). 
 2. Id. Growers and packinghouses included Santa Paula Creek 
Ranch; CPR Farms; Green Lear Farms, Inc.; Bravante Produce; and Richard 
Bagdasarian, Inc. 
 3. Id. at *1. 
 4. Id. at *7, *8. 
 5.  Id. at *2. 
 6. Id. at *1.  
 7.  Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 7711(a)). 
 8. Id. 
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In May 2016, APHIS proposed a new rule that would permit 
lemons to be imported to the United States from northwest Argentina 
(“Proposed Rule”).9 The Proposed Rule acknowledged that the Argentine 
citrus crops were affected by pests, but suggested that the risk of pests 
entering the United States via lemon importation could be effectively 
mitigated using a preventative “systems approach”.10 An initial analysis 
accompanied the Proposed Rule showing how the rule would negatively 
impact small businesses, as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act 
(“RFA”). The analysis estimated that between 15,000 and 20,000 metric 
tons of fresh lemons would be imported from Argentina annually, causing 
a decline in the price of lemons of 2% to 4%.11 This equated to a $10.9 
million and $22 million loss to California and Arizona each year 
respectively, which the analysis concluded was not a significant effect.12 
Following a notice and comment period, APHIS published its Final Rule 
(“Rule”) governing the importation of lemons from Argentina, scheduled 
to go into effect on May 26, 2017.13 On May 1, 2017, the USDA issued an 
amendment to the Final Rule (“Amendment”), without providing public 
comment, which stated “for 2017 and 2018, Argentine lemons would be 
imported only into the northeastern United States.” 14  
The Plaintiffs brought suit against the Defendants on May 17, 
2017, challenging the Final Rule and the Amendment under the PPA, 
APA, National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), and RFA.15 The 
Plaintiffs amended their complaint to include six counts against the 
Defendants, including: failure to disclose data and notes from a 2015 
harvest site visit for public comment under the PPA and APA (“Count I”); 
failure to make proper considerations in the pest mitigating “systems 
approach” (“Count II”); failure to use notice and comment procedures to 
amend the Final Rule and reasoning for the Amendment under the PPA 
and APA (“Count III”); failure to provide reasoning for decisions made 
under the APA (“Count IV”); failure to comply with NEPA (“Count V”); 
and failure to comply with the RFA (“Count VI”).16 The Defendants 
moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the Plaintiffs lacked 
standing.17 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
 The court analyzed whether the Plaintiffs met their burden of 
proving standing to bring these claims.18 To satisfy the Constitution’s 
                                                     
 9. Id. 
 10.  Id. at *2. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. at *1, *2. 
 16. Id. at *2. 
 17.  Id. at *1. 
 18. Id. at *3. 
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standing requirement, the Plaintiffs were required to show (1) they had 
suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that was (a) concrete and particularized and (b) 
actual or imminent; (2) the injury was fairly traceable to the challenged 
action of the Defendants; and (3) it was likely, not merely speculative, that 
their injury would be redressed by a favorable decision.19  
 
A. The Plaintiffs Had Competitive Standing to Challenge the Final 
Rule.  
 
In order to invoke competitive standing, the court found that a 
party must “first allege that the challenged regulatory action has caused 
him injury in fact, economic or otherwise.”20 A plaintiff must show a 
direct injury and that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable 
court decision.21 The Plaintiffs argued APHIS’s own finding that 
domestic lemon growers would lose between $10.9 and $22 million as a 
result of a decline in price caused by Argentine lemon importation 
established an economic injury sufficient for standing.22 The Plaintiffs 
relied on case law stating, “‘economic actors suffer an injury in fact when 
agencies lift regulatory restrictions on their competitors or otherwise 
allow increased competition against them’” and that a reversal of the 
regulation would remedy the economic injury.23  
The Defendants argued that the importation of Argentine lemons 
would not cause the Plaintiffs concrete economic injury for four reasons: 
First, because they would be imported primarily during off-season 
months for U.S. lemon production; second, the Argentine lemons would 
be primarily sold in the northeastern U.S; third, the Argentine lemons are 
a different variety than U.S. lemons; and fourth, because of the 
uncertainty of lemon prices.24  
The court concluded the Plaintiffs could show concrete economic 
injury. Some lemons would be imported during months of U.S. lemon 
production, creating competition with U.S. lemons.25 Lemons could also 
be stored and sold during the off-season for production, which would 
increase the amount of time Plaintiffs would compete with imported 
Argentine lemons.26 The court also found the Defendants’ argument that 
the lemons would only be imported to the northeastern U.S. unavailing 
because an overall influx in supply of lemons would drive prices down 
across the nation.27 Additionally, just because the lemons would be 
imported to the northeast does not mean they could not be sold across the 
                                                     
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 
397 U.S. 150 (1970)).  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at *5. 
 23. Id. (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 861 F.3d at 950).  
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. at *6. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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country, and the Plaintiffs sold lemons to the northeastern U.S., so 
economic competition would exist.28 Moreover, the court found 
immaterial the fact that Argentine lemons were a different variety than 
U.S. lemons, as an overall increase in the supply of lemons would lead to 
a drop in prices, as shown by APHIS’s own predictions.29 Finally, 
although lemon prices fluctuated, the basic principles of supply and 
demand indicated that an overall increase in supply would drive down 
prices.30 The court concluded that the causal chain between the 
importation of Argentine lemons and the harm to the Plaintiffs was 
obvious; therefore, the Plaintiffs had competitive standing to pursue 
Counts I, II, IV, and VI.31 
 
B. The Plaintiffs Had Environmental Standing to Challenge the 
Final Rule. 
 
The Plaintiffs maintained they had environmental standing to 
bring their claims based on the risk that the imported Argentine lemons 
could contain certain diseases that would spread to domestic lemons.32 The 
Defendants contended that the spread of disease was highly speculative.33  
The court acknowledged Ninth Circuit precedent that “an 
increased risk of future environmental injury constitutes an injury-in-fact 
for purposes of standing” and that “‘there is no requirement that the risk 
of future injury satisfy any particular threshold of significance.’”34 
Therefore, if the harm a plaintiff faces is credible, real and immediate, he 
has met the injury-in-fact requirement for standing.35  
The court found that the environmental harm to the Plaintiffs was 
credible, real and immediate, and combined with APHIS’s own findings, 
adequately established a significant risk of harm from pests due to 
Argentine lemon importation.36 Accordingly, the Plaintiffs were not 
required to “map out exactly how the disease would spread in excruciating 
detail” to show a significant risk.37 Second, according to APHIS’s 
Proposed Rule, APHIS identified nine pests of quarantine significance, 
several of which posed “[medium or] high risk” for their potential 
                                                     
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at *7  
32. Id. (citing Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th 
Cir. 2010)). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. (citing Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,  
402 F.3d 846, 860 (9th Cir. 2005); Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 
230 F.3d 1141, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2000); Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United State, 
306 F.3d 938, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2002)) (quoting San Luis & Delta–Mendota Water 
Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 905 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1170–71 (E.D. Cal. 
2012)).  
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at *8. 
 37.  Id.  
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likelihood of introduction into the continental U.S.38 Third, Plaintiffs 
showed that pests carried on lemons imported only in the northeastern U.S. 
could spread to California crops and cause damage by national 
distribution.39 Therefore, Plaintiffs established environmental standing to 
pursue Counts I, II, IV, V, and VI by showing the Final Rule would cause 
a significant risk of environmental injury.40  
 
C. The U.S. Citrus Science Council Had Organizational Standing to 
Challenge the Final Rule. 
 
Defendants argued that the Council lacked standing to bring any 
claims because the organization itself did not suffer a concrete injury.41 
The court found that the Council had associational standing to bring suit 
on behalf of its members.42  
An organization has associational standing to bring suit on 
behalf of its members “when its members would otherwise have standing 
to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the 
organization’s purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief 
requested requires the participation of individual members.”43 The court 
found that the Ninth Circuit does not require each member of an 
organization to be identified if the injury is readily apparent, and the 
organization need only know that at least one of its members is injured.44  
The Council is made up of citrus packinghouses, several of 
which are made up of individual growers.45 The individual grower 
members of the packinghouses had been determined to have standing in 
their own right, so the packinghouses had standing to sue on behalf of 
their growers and the Council had standing to sue on behalf of its 
member packinghouses.46 
 
D. Plaintiffs Did Not Have Standing to Challenge the Amendment to 
the Final Rule as Alleged in Count III. 
 
Plaintiffs’ Count III alleged that APHIS violated its duty to use 
notice-and-comment procedures to amend its regulation restricting the 
importation of Argentine lemons to the northeastern U.S.47 Defendants 
                                                     
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at *9 (citing Nat’l Council of La Raza v. Cegavske, 8 00 F.3d  
1032, 1041 (9th Cir. 2015); Fleck & Assocs., Inc. v. Phoenix, City of, an Arizona 
Mun. Corp., 471 F.3d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental 
Serv., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000)). 
 44. Id. (citing Nat’l Council of La Raza v. Cegavske, 800 F.3d 1032, 
1041 (9th Cir. 2015)). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at *10. 
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argued that Count III should be dismissed because it could not be 
redressed by a favorable decision.48  
The court did not dismiss Count III on redressability grounds, 
but on procedural grounds. As established by the Ninth Circuit, “one 
who challenges the violation of a procedural right to protect his concrete 
interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for 
traceability and redressability.”49 To establish procedural standing, the 
Plaintiffs had to demonstrate that the opportunity to exercise their 
procedural rights through notice and comment on the Amendment would 
have made a difference to their concrete interests.50 However, the 
Plaintiffs did not allege they were injured by the Amendment, and their 
concrete interests did not pertain to the Amendment.51 Therefore, the 
Plaintiffs adequately alleged a procedural violation, but not a procedural 
injury, so they lacked standing to pursue Count III.52 
 
E. Plaintiffs Had Standing under the RFA to Challenge the Final 
Rule. 
 
The Defendants argued that the Plaintiffs’ did not have standing 
to bring Count IV, which challenged the USDA’s compliance with the 
RFA, because Plaintiffs failed to allege they were small entities eligible 
for judicial review under the RFA.53 However, the Plaintiffs did allege 
that at least one of their members qualified as a small entity under the 
RFA. Thus, the court concluded this was sufficient to establish the 
Plaintiffs’ standing to bring Count IV, even though not all of the 
Plaintiffs were small entities.54  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California 
found that the USDA regulation allowing for the importation of lemons 
from Argentina could be challenged by lemon growers, packinghouses, 
and the Council due to overall increased competition and the risk of 
environmental harm to domestic lemon production. This decision is 
notable because it clarifies the pathway for domestic growers to protect 
their production against foreign imports and provides them with a more 
reliable domestic market. However, this trade restriction could negatively 
impact consumers by eliminating competition. Restricting imports could 
also negatively impact the export of U.S. crops to other countries, 
causing a less reliable export market.  
                                                     
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. (quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Jewell, 749 F.3d 776, 782-
83 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at *11. 
 52.  Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
